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 Historical reflections on Islam and the Occident 
by 
R.C. van Caenegem 
 
A Green Curtain ? 
 
For many years the global divide was between freedom-loving West and Soviet-
dominated East, two antagonistic worlds separated by an Iron Curtain. 
Nowadays the great divide is between Islam and the West, as if a Green Curtain 
had taken the place of the Iron Curtain of the past. I use the term Green 
Curtain because of the green colour displayed on Islamic flags. The term Velvet 
Curtain was used by S.P. Huntington when he wrote that “the Velvet Curtain of 
culture has replaced the Iron Curtain of ideology as the most significant 
dividing line in Europe”, i.e. between Latin and Orthodox Christianity i. 
Listening to the media and reading some scholars one gains the impression that 
two totally different worlds are clashing. The lands of Islam are perceived as in 
the grip of an intolerant religion, where apostasy and adultery are punished by 
death, criminals mutilated, women oppressed and homosexuals persecuted. 
These countries have, moreover, autocratic, one-party governments, are 
blissfully ignorant of the rule of law, freedom of expression or independent 
judges. They embody the “descending theory of power” ii. In contrast the  
Occident is depicted as tolerant or even indifferent in religious matters, ruled 
by law and freely elected politicians. It also enjoys personal freedom, notably in 
sexual behaviour, and is respectful of women’s rights. In its crudest form the 
opposition is one, in K. Mahbubani’s words, between Islam, perceived as a 
force of darkness and a virtuous Christian civilization iii. 
Seen in these stark terms talking of a “clash of civilizations” seems at first sight 
entirely justified. What struck me, however, when reading such authors as 
S.P.Huntington and B. Lewis, was that they are political scientists or politically 
engaged students of religion, who focus on to-day’s power struggle iv. But the 
present is only the latest stage in a development that spanned many centuries, 
so that writing about Christendom and Islam without taking full account of 
their origins and historic experiences is short-sighted and one-sided. 
 
Fourteen centuries of Old Europe and fourteen centuries of Old Islam. 
 
I decided therefore that, having for many years taught the general history of 
the Middle Ages and the legal history of medieval and Ancien Régime Europe, I 
was in a position to offer an historical approach to the debate. Viewing the 
history of Latin Christendom, the cradle of the modern West, one distinguishes 
two stages. The first, which I would like to call Old Europe v, goes from the 
fourth century, when Christianity became the only legitimate religion within 
the Roman Empire,vi to the eighteenth, when the Enlightenment and modern 
Europe arrived on the scene. These fourteen centuries betray a great similarity 
with the fourteen centuries traversed by Islam from the time of Muhammad to 
the present day, when we may be witnessing the breakthrough of modernity in 
Muslim countries. What strikes me, when comparing Old Europe with Old Islam 
is not how much they were at variance but, on the contrary, how similar they 
were. In other words, Islam and the West are not so much different as passing 
through a different stage in their history – a difference in chronology rather 
than in essence. The Occident and Islam were also comparable great and 
competing powers, sometimes expanding and sometimes contracting. In the 
seventh and eighth centuries Islam conquered North Africa and Visigothic 
Spain. A few centuries later the crusaders made inroads into Muslim lands in 
North Africa and the Near East. Afterwards, in 1529 and again in 1683, the 
Muslim Turks besieged Vienna, but from the nineteenth century onwards the 
Ottoman Empire was in retreat.  
 
Old Europe seen through a critical lens. 
 
Let us have a cool look at Old Europe. Religion was pervasive and dominant at 
all levels, social and personal. Medieval knights went on crusade hoping to die 
in battle and go straight to heaven. The authority of the Bible was unassailable, 
just like that of the Koran in the other civilisation, even though conflicting 
interpretations of the Holy Book flourished leading to the formation of various 
sects and denominations. The Christian faith itself, however, was not in 
dispute. Apostasy was punished by death, as happened in 1222 when 
Archbishop Stephen Langton “held a provincial council at Oxford, and there he 
degraded and handed over to the lay power a deacon who had turned Jew for 
the love of a Jewess. The apostate was delivered to the sheriff of Oxfordshire, 
who forthwith  burnt him” vii. In 1650, under Cromwell’s Puritans, adultery was 
made punishable by death, as was fornication (on a second conviction). This 
was two years after the Blasphemy Act had made it a capital offence to deny 
the Trinity or the authority of the Scriptures viii.  
Kingship was autocratic, tempered in the Middle Ages by representative 
assemblies, but under the Ancien Régime royal absolutism triumphed. 
Parliaments became servile or ceased meeting altogether as happened in 
France, where the Etats généraux were redundant from 1614 to 1789. 
Imprisonment without trial was common, on the strength of a mere royal lettre 
de cachet. Human rights stood no chance in a criminal process based on secret 
inquisition and torture. Women were subject to paternal or marital authority 
and without access to higher education or the world of politics (except  for the 
very few who happened to inherit a throne).  The criminal law can best be 
described as barbaric and arbitrary. Judges were appointed and dismissed at 
will by the Crown, as happened to the most learned common lawyer of all time, 
Sir Edward Coke, Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, who was sent home by 
King James I:  when the judge rightly argued that he had the better knowledge 
of the law, the monarch replied that he was the law, the lex animata. 
 
 
Modern Europe enters the scene. 
 
It was this world that came under attack during the Enlightenment, the dawn of 
modern Europe. Doubt was cast on the very dogmas of Christianity by 
philosophers, scientists and broad sections of public opinion. Science came to 
replace magic.  Criticism of the inhumanity of criminal law led to legal reform. 
Royal absolutism was contested and confronted with the ascending theory of 
power. The state henceforth belonged to the people and not to the Crown. The 
independence of the judiciary was secured and criminal and civil codes 
promulgated, providing legal certainty. Freedom of conscience was guaranteed 
and religious discrimination abolished or greatly reduced. 
The most dramatic breakthrough came about under the impact of two famous 
revolutions. The Thirteen Colonies achieved independence from Great Britain 
and founded a state with a written constitution inspired by the European 
Enlightenment. The United States of America replaced the hereditary king by 
an elected president, created two elective houses of Congress, declared the 
separation of Church and state, excluded religious discrimination (although 
remaining a Christian nation), proclaimed freedom of thought and expression 
and adopted the federal form of government, which would inspire many 
countries round the world. The belief of the new republic in the supremacy of 
the law went so far as to place even the lawgiver under the constitutional 
control of the Supreme Court. 
On the European continent the French Revolution sounded the death knell of 
the Ancien Régime, whereas ever since the Bill of Rights of 1689 England had 
been the great liberal pioneer. 
The nineteenth century enjoyed the fruits of these achievements: liberal 
constitutions, elected representative assemblies and the rule of law became 
established. Scholars enjoyed freedom of thought, so that Charles Darwin could 
publish his controversial Origin of Species in peace, as Ludwig Feuerbach could 
make his provocative statement that “God did not make man but man made 
God”. See the remarks of Amartya Sen on the modern West as a result of the 
Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution, and his conclusion that it would 
be wrong to contrast a century–old Western tradition with non-Western ones 
(treating each as monolithic) ix. 
Modernisation, however was a slow and as yet unfinished business. Slavery 
was abolished in Great Britain in 1833 and in the United States in 1863 and in 
1823, a man had been jailed for sixty days in Massachusetts for an essay in the 
Boston Investigator that denied the existence of God, whereas in 1824 a state-
court judge said that “Christianity is and always has been, a part of the 
common law of Pennsylvania”. x  Male franchise was gradually extended, but 
women had to wait till the twentieth century to win the vote, enter Parliament 
and obtain legal equality. This same century also witnessed what German 
historians call a Rückschlag in ältere Formen, a return to older forms, when 
dictatorship entered the scene, ideological repression reappeared and 
minorities were persecuted. Even to-day, in the twenty-first century, the 
Roman Church is ruled autocratically by a pontiff who wields legislative, 
executive and judicial powers, in true Old European style and  in harmony with 
Pius IX’s Syllabus Errorum of 1864, which condemned a long list of modern 
liberal principles, such as freedom of conscience and democracy. The Second 
Vatican Council made plans for a Lex Ecclesiae Fundamentalis, a fundamental 
law for the Church, modelled on the constitutions of the modern states and 
including a chapter entitled “On the faithful of Christ and their rights”. The 
undertaking made good headway and a draft in the form of a printed book was 
sent to all the bishops, but the innovative plan never materialized as the 
project never made the statute book. One reason,I believe is the great gap 
between an autocratic government and a constitution with a declaration of 
rights which, by definition, limits the absolute power at the top. No checks and 
balances here: autocracy and constitutions are uneasy bedfellows. And what 
next? A constitutional court empowered to strike down papal decrees judged 
to be unconstitutional? For many bishops, theologians and canonists this would 
all be a bridge too far xi. The conservative view was expressed with great 
authority by the eminent canonist cardinal Alfons M. Stickler in a paper 
presented at a conference in Zurich in 1982 and published in 1983 xii. The 
author rejects the separation of powers and the democratic model for the 
constitution of the Church, whose fundamental law lies in God’s will. 
All this shows that the West ought not to be too boastful. Without belittling the 
remarkable achievement of Old Europe, contemplating its imperfections should 
be a lesson in humility. After all, the West has its own fundamentalists and laws 
against blasphemy. 
 
The dawn of modern Islam. 
 
As I am writing, mass demonstrations in several Arab lands are clamouring for 
freedom, accountable government and the rule of law, just as, centuries ago, 
Europe was demanding democracy. Is it an Arab spring, heralding a modern 
Islam? The chance of success is real. In Turkey we have a Muslim country  
which took the road to modernism a century ago and shows how Islam can co-
exist with a civil society. The human potential for an Arab renaissance is 
obvious, as Arab culture was a shining light when Europe went through the 
Dark Ages and Western scholars in Sicily and Spain were busy translating Arab 
treatises on philosophy and science into Latin, Muslim countries can, as we see 
every day, find the strength to demand and achieve a post-authoritarian world, 
even though, judging by the Western experience, the process is likely to be 
long and full of unpredictable ups and downs. 
George Sarton, doctor of science of Ghent University and the first occupant of 
the chair of the History of Science at Harvard University, devoted much his life 
to the study of medieval Arab science and philosophy. He spent the academic 
year 1931-32 in Syria and the Lebanon learning Arabic and wrote the 
encyclopaedic and authoritative Introduction to the History of Science in three 
volumes, between 1927 and 1947. The work covers the period from ancient 
Greece to the fourteenth century. In 1951 Sarton wrote a study devoted to 
Arab influences on occidental civilization significantly entitled The incubation of 
Western culture in the Middle East. The author was aware of the crucial role 
played by Arab science in the evolution of human thought. 
It is well known that scholastic theology, for many centuries the main stream of 
Western religious reflection, was based on a confrontation of the Bible and 
Aristotelian logic and natural science. It is, however, less generally appreciated 
that the Parisian theologians worked initially with Latin translations from Arabic 
translations (and commentaries), before having access, in the course of the 
thirteenth century, to Latin translations direct from the Greek originals. 
If one considers the leading role of Thomistic theology in the Christian World 
until the day of René Descartes and its revival in the late nineteenth century, 
one understands how important Arab scientific pursuits have been for Europe 
and the world at large. 
 
The decline and fall of Old Europe. 
 
Viewing the dawn of modern Islam we may wonder what caused the similar 
dawn in eighteenth-century Europe: what brought about that great crisis in the 
centuries-old Christian world? xiii. Attempting to answer this question it is useful 
to distinguish the political from the religious strands. In the world of politics it is 
clear what the cry for change was all about. When we read the eloquent 
cahiers de doléances of 1788 (lists of grievances), we hear the authentic voice 
of an educated nation, angry at being treated as an irresponsible child by an 
oppressive regime, demanding the end of autocratic kingship and longing for a 
liberal, constitutional and parliamentary state. Other countries –Austria, 
Prussia, Tuscany – were ruled by Enlightened and reformist princes, but France 
still lived under an old-fashioned and absolute monarchy of the Unenlightened 
variety. 
Why did this understandable anger, notably in France, not spill over earlier? 
The strong point of the absolute monarchy had been that it brought internal 
peace and stability in a country torn apart and brought to the brink of anarchy 
by religious wars and aristocratic frondes. This now fortunately belonged to the 
past, but autocratic rule produced a politically lifeless nation, without a 
national parliament and with obedient judges. In 1771 King Louis XV sent the 
not so obedient councillors of the Parlement of Paris, the highest law court in 
the land, into internal exile. So when the need for modernisation became 
acute, there was no political class, which could play the game of opposition 
versus government. The country had in fact no national politics.  This may 
explain why, after an orderly transition to constitutional monarchy, mainly 
inspired by the British model, the French Revolution suddenly, after the Jacobin 
coup d’état of 10 August 1792, erupted into the extreme and violent phase of 
the Terror (when the dreaded term first entered  into the political vocabulary) 
and the execution of King Louis XVI. It is clear that the political agenda of the 
eighteenth-century democrats, who brought down the old European order, had 
much in common with that of the demonstrators in several Arab countries in 
our own time.  
The situation in the religious field is quite different. In Europe Christianity itself 
was under scrutiny or even rejected outright, and during one phase of the 
French Revolution the Catholic religion was outlawed, the churches closed and 
temples built for the goddess Reason. Nothing comparable is going on in the 
lands of the Prophet: when mosques are being attacked it is by opposing 
Muslim sects or in ethnic conflict, but Islam itself is hardly ever contested. 
Distinguishing, as I did, the political and the religious elements is appropriate, 
but one should not forget that in Old Europe the two strands often overlapped. 
Kings were anointed by the Church and enjoyed the magic and prestige that 
religion bestowed on them. Consequently a weakening of Christian belief 
meant a weakening of the aura enjoyed by the rois thaumaturges, the miracle-
working kings.  
It is, nevertheless, legitimate to distinguish the two strands, inter alia, because 
of the different situation in the old West and in present-day Islam. The most 
logical step in our enquiry must therefore be to wonder why – in religious 
matters – the two civilizations took such different courses. Why did Europe, 
and particularly the revolutionary government in France, turn against the 
Christian faith and the Catholic Church, the visible embodiment of Christianity 
in France? It is noteworthy that in other Christian countries – Great Britain, the 
United States, Germany – there was religious scepsis and tolerance, but no 
wholesale rejection of the old faith. The French situation was different because 
of the dominant position of the wealthy Catholic Church, which enjoyed a 
religious monopoly and, of course, belonged to the supranational and strongly 
centralized Roman Church. In a country where Christianity coincided with 
Catholicism, anticlerical agitation in the wake of the revolutionary upheavals 
was understandable: the unique position of the French Church made it an 
obvious target for sceptics and  unbelievers. The contrast with Islam is obvious. 
There we find neither a universal centralized Church nor national Churches, no 
institutional link between rulers and religion and no anointment of caliphs or 
sultans by religious leaders, even though Islam teaches obedience to authority 
and the kings are protectors of the faith, which goes a long way to explain why 
the religious element, so obvious in the eighteenth-century agitation, is no 
issue in the present-day revolts in the Arab world and why  Islam is still a 
religion with solid roots in society, even though autocratic regimes are widely 
contested. 
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